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Abstract
Previous work shows that when an image of a face is presented immediately prior to each trial of a speeded cognitive
task (face-priming), the error-related negativity (ERN) is upregulated for Asians, but it is downregulated for
Caucasians. These findings are consistent with the hypothesis that images of “generalized other” vary cross-culturally
such that they evoke anxiety for Asians, whereas they serve as safety cues for Caucasians. Here, we tested whether the
cross-cultural variation in the face-priming effect would be observed in a gambling paradigm. Caucasian Americans,
Asian Americans, and Asian sojourners were exposed to a brief flash of a schematic face during a gamble. For Asian
Americans, face-priming resulted in significant increases of both negative-going deflection of ERP upon negative
feedback (feedback-related negativity [FRN]) and positive-going deflection of ERP upon positive feedback (feedback-
related positivity [FRP]). For Caucasian Americans, face-priming showed a significant reversal, decreasing both FRN
and FRP. The cultural difference in the face-priming effect in FRN and FRP was partially mediated by interdependent
self-construal. Curiously, Asian sojourners showed a pattern similar to the one for Caucasian Americans. Our findings
suggest that culture shapes neural pathways in both systematic and highly dynamic fashion.
Descriptors: Emotion, Individual differences, EEG
As Aristotle famously proclaimed, “Man is by nature a social ani-
mal.” Modern research in psychology has provided ample evidence
for this time-honored observation by examining how humans pro-
cess and respond to the faces of their conspecifics. For example,
human newborns have an exquisite sensitivity to face stimuli
(Meltzoff & Moore, 1983). Among human adults, a specific region
of the brain (the fusiform face area) is devoted to processing faces
(Kanwisher & Yovel, 2006; Meltzoff & Moore, 1983). And more
recent research suggests that a mere exposure to face-like images is
sometimes sufficient to modulate one’s motivational state (Haley
& Fessler, 2005; Rigdon, Ishii, Watabe, & Kitayama, 2009).
In the current work, we built on this growing body of research
on face processing and investigated the hypothesis that the motiva-
tional effect of an exposure to a face stimulus (face-priming)
depends on one’s cultural background. In particular, our previous
work suggests that face-priming upregulates error processing for
Asians, but it may downregulate it for Caucasian Americans
(Kitayama, Snibbe, Markus, & Suzuki, 2004; Na & Kitayama,
2012; Park & Kitayama, 2014). To sharpen our analysis, we drew
on existing work on electrocortical responses to reward prediction
errors (Holroyd & Coles, 2002), and hypothesized that face-
priming would modulate the sensitivity to reward prediction errors
depending on the cultural backgrounds of the subjects (Kitayama
& Tompson, 2015). Specifically, we anticipated that face-priming
would upregulate the electrocortical responses to reward predic-
tion errors for individuals with Asian, interdependent cultural
backgrounds. In contrast, face-priming was expected to downregu-
late such electrocortical responses for those with Caucasian, inde-
pendent cultural backgrounds.
Culture: Two Senses in the Concept
We use the term culture in two different ways, following prior
effort by social and behavioral scientists to define this term
(Kroeber & Kluckhohn, 1952). First, culture in singular refers to a
historically accumulated set of meanings and practices. In this
sense, culture varies systematically across regions of the globe in
terms of the model of the self that is shared and authenticated
therein (Kitayama & Uskul, 2011; Markus & Kitayama, 1991).
Second, cultures in plural refer to historically demarcated ethnic or
racial groups. Thus, people of Caucasian and Asian descent will be
referred to as Caucasians and Asians, respectively.
Reflecting long-term ecological conditions and the subsistence
systems that they afforded over the last 10,000 years, cultural tradi-
tions that emerged in Eastern regions of the Eurasian continent
(Asian cultures) are thought to be more interdependent or less inde-
pendent compared with the traditions that developed in relatively
The research reported here was supported by a Walter R. Lambuth grant
from Kwansei Gakuin University to Hidefumi Hitokoto and a National
Science Foundation grant (SES 1325881) to Shinobu Kitayama. This
article benefitted from comments made by members of the Culture and
Cognition Lab of the University of Michigan on an earlier draft.
Address correspondence to: Shinobu Kitayama, Department of Psy-




Psychophysiology, 53 (2016), 52–63. Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Printed in the USA.
Copyright VC 2015 Society for Psychophysiological Research
DOI: 10.1111/psyp.12554
more Western regions (Caucasian cultures) (Kitayama & Uskul,
2011; Oishi, 2014; Talhelm et al., 2014; Uskul, Kitayama, & Nisbett,
2008). Although not clearly demarcated, the two broad regions of
East and West have accumulated relatively unique sets of both
meanings (lay theories, religious beliefs, and common sense) and
practices (behavioral scripts, rituals, and conventions). Over time,
various physical features of residents such as skin tone, eye color,
and height among many others (ethnicity or race markers) have
changed, mediated through a series of polymorphic genetic changes.
Thus, ethnicity or race (e.g., Asian vs. Caucasian, or culture under
the second definition) serves as a reasonable proxy of cultural tradi-
tions each individual carries (culture in the first sense).
Notably, while Asian versus Caucasian cultures originally
developed in Eastern versus Western regions of the Eurasian conti-
nent, the cultural traditions from the respective regions have since
been implanted in other regions of the globe, most notably in North
America, as people from the Eurasian continent immigrated to the
North American continent over the last several hundred years.
Whereas Asian Americans carry Asian cultural meanings and prac-
tices, Caucasian Americans carry Caucasian cultural meanings and
practices.
In our conceptualization, culture in the first sense is an amalgam
of both collective (i.e., socially shared) and individual (i.e., cogni-
tively represented) components that are interconnected to form a
loosely organized system of meanings and practices (Kitayama,
2002; Kitayama, Markus, Matsumoto, & Norasakkunkit, 1997).
Self-report measures of the construal of the self as independent or
interdependent (Singelis, 1994) is an index of that aspect of culture
that is cognitively represented in each person’s self-concept.
Culture and Generalized Other
In Western cultures, especially Caucasian American cultures, the
self is assumed to be independent. According to this independent
model of the self, one’s behavior is guided and organized by his or
her internal attributes such as desires, attitudes, and preferences. In
contrast, in Eastern cultures, especially East Asian cultures, the self
is assumed to be interdependent. According to this model of the
self, one’s behavior is guided and organized by others’ expectations
and obligations to them. Depending on which model of the self is
more dominant in their own cultures, individuals may show con-
trasting psychological responses in the presence of other people.
Close interdependence with others in social relations requires
attunement to each other’s social expectations. Interdependent
individuals (e.g., Asians and Asian Americans) are therefore moti-
vated to adjust their behaviors to social expectations. Accordingly,
when interacting with known others, worries may arise regarding
what obligations they might have, where they might fall short by
way of satisfying expectations, and what evaluations may be put
on the self. Consistent with this analysis, Asians typically attend
closely to their potential shortcomings and negative features
(Kitayama et al., 1997). They are thus relatively pessimistic
(Chang & Asakawa, 2003), and high in social anxiety (Okazaki,
Liu, Longworth, & Minn, 2002). This pessimism is likely adaptive
in Asian culture because it enables the individuals to avoid any
potential social mishaps or transgressions and to conform to the
expectations of others. Once socialized in this interdependent cul-
tural system, individuals may eventually associate certain negative
emotions such as worry, apprehension, and anxiety to images of a
“generalized other” (Mead, 1934). Accordingly, face cues may be
sufficient to activate neural pathways linked to the negative emo-
tions of fear and anxiety.
In contrast, independence of the self entails relative autonomy
from others’ expectations. In interacting with others, independent
individuals (e.g., Caucasian Americans) will not experience as
much worry or anxiety as Asians would. Evidence shows that they
attend to positive aspects of themselves (Kitayama et al., 1997) and
are relatively optimistic (Taylor & Brown, 1988). Moreover, Cau-
casians often praise and complement one another because helping
close others to maintain their self-esteem is considered an impor-
tant way to display one’s friendship to them (Heine, Lehman, Mar-
kus, & Kitayama, 1999). Consistent with this evidence, Caucasian
Americans tend to be relatively low in social anxiety (Okazaki,
2000) while showing higher levels of general trust as compared to
Asians (Yamagishi, Cook, & Watabe, 1998). Once socialized in
this cultural context, individuals are unlikely to associate negative
emotions to face cues. Instead, because close others often willingly
provide emotional support to one’s self-esteem and confidence, the
faces of these others may serve as a safety signal. Accordingly, the
face cues may be expected to inhibit the neural pathways linked to
negative emotions such as fear and anxiety.
Face-Priming and Error-Related Negativity
When anxiety is elicited, individuals become more vigilant of
potential threats (Cisler & Koster, 2010). They carefully monitor
both their behaviors and the surrounding environment for errors
and conflicts (Hajcak, McDonald, & Simons, 2003). In a recent
experiment, Park and Kitayama (2014) tested whether error proc-
essing would be modulated by exposure to face images. Both Cau-
casian Americans and East Asians performed a speeded flanker
task, where participants were instructed to respond to the direction
of a center arrow flanked by either congruent (same direction) or
incongruent (opposite direction) arrows. Right before the flanker
was presented, a racially and emotionally neutral-looking realistic
face image was presented very briefly for an average duration of
90 ms. When individuals make an error in a speeded cognitive
task, a marked negative deflection around the frontocentral scalp
region arises immediately after the initiation of the response itself.
This ERP component is called the error-related negativity (ERN)
(Holroyd & Coles, 2002). The ERN is thought to originate in or
near the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), and indicate a negative
reward prediction error that is based on a computation of the cur-
rent outcome (an incorrect response) as being worse than expected
(a correct response) (Gehring & Willoughby, 2004; Miltner,
Braun, & Coles, 1997; Nieuwenhuis, Holroyd, Mol, & Coles,
2004). This prediction error signal may be augmented by response
conflict between competing responses (Botvinick, Cohen, & Car-
ter, 2004; Yeung, 2004). Previous work shows that ERN is associ-
ated with trait anxiety (Hajcak et al., 2003; Moser, Moran,
Schroder, Donnellan, & Yeung, 2013).
Park and Kitayama (2014) found that Asians showed a signifi-
cantly greater ERN in the face-priming condition than in control
conditions (where either an image of a house or scrambled face
was presented as a prime). This finding is consistent with the
hypothesis that face images induce transient anxiety. In contrast,
Caucasian Americans showed a marginally reduced ERN in the
face-priming condition as compared in the control conditions. In
order to examine the hypothesis that Asians are relatively interde-
pendent and thus they worry about potentially negative evaluations
the others might hold about them, the researchers used a self-report
self-construal measure. In line with the hypothesis, the cultural dif-
ference in the face-priming effect was predicted by interdependent
self-construal such that Asians were both higher in interdependent
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self-construal and showed a greater magnitude of the face-priming
effect. The Park and Kitayama (2014) study provides initial evi-
dence for the hypothesis that face images transiently increase anxi-
ety for Asians. When anxiety is induced, the ACC may be
sensitized. As a consequence, the same error response may produce
a larger error signal (ERN). Conversely, when anxiety is relieved,
the ACC may be desensitized. Consequently, the same error
response may produce a smaller error signal (ERN). The Caucasian
result is consistent with this analysis, although caution is required
because the result was statistically marginal.
Extension to a Gambling Paradigm
Although the Park and Kitayama (2014) findings are promising,
it leaves two important issues unaddressed. First, the speeded
cognitive task may be particularly likely to produce anxiety for
Asians because this task is akin to an intelligence test, which is
valued rather strongly in Asian cultures (Sue & Okazaki, 1990).
It is also unclear whether the effect of face-priming on error-
processing may generalize to noncognitive tasks. Second, the
error signal that was tested in the Park and Kitayama (2014)
study was contingent on the detection of an error in one’s own
response. It is not clear whether the same face-priming effect
would be observed in response to feedback of one’s response as
correct or incorrect.
To address these questions, we adapted a gambling task, which
involves no cognitive, IQ test–like component. Moreover, in a
gamble, subjects make a choice between two options. One option
is linked to a gain of a certain monetary amount and the other, a
loss of the same amount. When outcome feedback is delivered, it
produces certain error signals. Hence, the gambling task is quite
suitable to assess the generality of the hypothesis that mere expo-
sure to face images is sufficient to increase or decrease the ACC
sensitivity depending on cultural background of subjects.
In the typical gambling task, the frequency of win versus loss
trials is set to be equal. Under such conditions, loss feedback pro-
duces a negative-going ERP component centered around the fron-
tocentral scalp region. This component is called the feedback-
related negativity (FRN) (Gehring & Willoughby, 2002, 2004;
Miltner et al., 1997). In addition to the FRN (which is contingent
on loss feedback), the win feedback may produce an analogous
error signal because the win is just as unexpected as the loss. Spe-
cifically, the win feedback produces a positive-going ERP compo-
nent around the same region. This component is referred to as the
feedback correct-related positivity or, simply, the feedback-related
positivity (FRP) (Holroyd, Pakzad-Vaezi, & Krigolson, 2008).
Holroyd and Coles (2002) have proposed that both FRN and
FRP are reward prediction signals reflecting phasic shifts in dopa-
mine activity in the ACC. Because anxiety is likely to sensitize the
ACC, it may be expected to increase the magnitude of both FRN
and FRP. Consistent with this expectation, numerous studies have
shown that motivational states influence FRN (Gehring &
Willoughby, 2002; Holroyd & Coles, 2002). For example, the FRN
magnitude increases when motivation is increased by monetary
incentives (Boksem, Tops, Wester, Meijman, & Lorist, 2006; Haj-
cak, Moser, Holroyd, & Simons, 2006). To date, much previous
work focused only on FRN. However, Walsh and Anderson (2012)
show that increased motivation (and, thus, increased ACC sensitiv-
ity) is associated with increases of the magnitude of both FRN and
FRP. That is, FRN becomes more negative and FRP, more positive
(Walsh & Anderson, 2012).
In short, a gambling paradigm provides us with an opportunity
to assess the robustness and generality of the Park and Kitayama
(2014) ERN findings. We hypothesized that for Asians, face-
priming would increase the ACC sensitivity, thereby increasing
both FRN and FRP. For Caucasians, we hypothesized that face-
priming would reduce the ACC sensitivity, thereby decreasing both
FRN and FRP. Furthermore, we anticipated that the cultural differ-
ence in the face-priming effect on FRN and FRP would be
explained at least in part by individual differences in interdepend-
ent self-construal.
Asian Americans and Asian Sojourners
In sharpening our cross-cultural predictions, we compared three
ethnic groups—Caucasian Americans (U.S.-born Americans of
Caucasian ancestry), Asian Americans (U.S.-born Americans of
Asian ancestry), and Asian sojourners (Asian-born Asians who
have stayed in the United States for up to 10 years). Previous
cross-cultural work on Caucasian versus Asian differences typi-
cally examined Caucasians in the United States and Asians in
Asian countries such as China, Japan, and Korea. Some sizable
number of studies tested Asian Americans instead of Asians in
Asia, and confirmed the cross-cultural predictions. A meta-
analysis of studies using scale measures of independent versus
interdependent self-construal (or equivalently, individualism ver-
sus collectivism) show that Asian Americans tend to be just as
interdependent as Asians in Asia are (Oyserman, Coon, &
Kemmelmeier, 2002). Asian Americans carry Asian cultural tra-
ditions, as much as Caucasian Americans carry Caucasian cul-
tural traditions. Hence, we expected that our Asian prediction
(face-priming producing increases of both FRN and FRP) would
hold for Asian Americans.
It has so far been relatively rare to use Asian-born Asians in the
United States as an Asian sample. When this sample is tested, the
results appear to be more variable. It is conceivable that Asian-
born Asians retain their Asian identity and cultural tradition
(Kitayama et al., 2014). However, it is also conceivable that they
chose to come to North America because they did not fit in to the
Asian interdependent culture. They may constitute a relatively less
interdependent or more independent subgroup in Asian societies
and thus exhibit different neural responses. The latter possibility
would suggest that Asian sojourners might be relatively more
independent in comparison with Asian Americans (Kitayama,
Duffy, Kawamura, & Larsen, 2003). It was therefore uncertain




Forty-four East Asian and 42 Caucasian American undergraduates
at the University of Michigan participated in the study for course
credit and a chance to win a monetary reward of up to $10. The
ethnicity of each participant was determined by self-reported
ancestry (East Asian versus European). Seven participants were
removed for medication use (2), history of head injury (3), and
deliberately not following instructions (2). Ten more participants
were dropped because inspection with standard artifact rejection
criteria (Luck, 2014) revealed that their ERP data were excessively
noisy. In total, 69 participants (29 males, Mage 5 19.1, SD 5 1.37)
of either Caucasian (34 total, 16 males, Mage 5 18.7, SD 5 0.87) or
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East Asian (35 total, 13 males, Mage 5 19.5, SD 5 1.63) descent
were included. Among East Asians, 14 of them had spent less than
10 years in the United States when tested (5 males, Mage 5 20.36,
SD 5 1.74), and most of them came to the United States for col-
lege. All of the remaining 21 East Asian participants had been both
born and raised in the United States. These two groups are referred
to as Asian sojourners and Asian Americans, respectively. All par-
ticipants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision.
Procedure
Upon arrival, participants were told that the study would record
brain responses during a simple gambling task. All participants
were seated approximately 60 cm from a 15-inch cathode-ray tube
color monitor while EEG electrode equipment was attached. Next,
participants were given a practice block including 10 trials to get
familiar with the procedure, followed by the actual experiment con-
sisting of 6 blocks with 32 trials each. The gambling task procedure
was modified from a design used by Gehring and Willoughby
(2002).
Participants were given 5,000 points to start the gamble. They
were told that depending on the amount of points they had at the
end of the study, they would be awarded up to $10. On each trial, a
fixation point was presented for 500 ms, followed by two blank
squares placed side by side (see Figure 1). Participants were told to
choose one of them to earn points. They were to make their selec-
tion by pressing one of the two corresponding keys on the keyboard
with their index fingers. They were told that there would be some
distracting stimuli between the two windows and were asked to
ignore them. The cards remained on the screen for up to 10 s or
until the choice was registered. Feedback was given 1,000 ms after
the choice was made, by having the cards turn green or red (indi-
cating win and loss, respectively). Point information was displayed
on the card in black text indicating how many points (either 50 or
150 points) were won or lost. The points won or lost were either
added or subtracted from the participant’s running total points.
Eight hundred ms after feedback, the next trial started with the pre-
sentation of a fixation cross. Following the completion of each
block, participants were asked how much they thought they had
won or lost points in the preceding block on a scale from 1 to 10
(1: lose a lot, 10: win a lot). After responding, the total points
earned were displayed at the end of each block.
Within the gambling task adopted, participants were pre-
sented with a priming stimulus on each trial. When the two
cards were presented, either a schematic face or a scrambled
face was also presented between the cards simultaneously. Sche-
matic faces varied in emotional expression, (i.e., neutral, happy,
or angry). Sample priming stimuli are shown in Figure 1. The
priming stimulus was displayed for 90 ms, whereas the cards
remained on the screen until participants made a choice. Partici-
pants were asked to ignore “distracter figures” that would be
flashed while performing the gambling task. There was the total
of four priming conditions (the three face conditions and a con-
trol [i.e., scrambled face] condition). Within each block of 32
trials, half of the trials corresponded to each of the two point
conditions (50 versus 150 points). In addition, the four priming
conditions were allocated three trials each. The outcome of the
gamble was randomly determined on each trial. Over the six
blocks, there were 24 trials in each of the 8 conditions defined
by priming (4) and point (2).
Each of the four priming conditions had the total of 48 trials
across the 6 blocks (outcome [2] x point [2] x 6 blocks). To mini-
mize any habituation effects, we prepared 48 unique schematic
faces by jittering head shape (circle, vertical oval, horizontal oval,
square, vertical rectangle, horizontal rectangle) and relative posi-
tions of nose and mouth each of which varied in 8 directions and 3
distances. Emotions were manipulated by changing the shapes of
eyebrows and the mouth. Scrambled images were created by taking
each modified face-stimulus and entering them into an image-
scrambling program such that every scrambled image contained
the same ratio of black-to-white space. The scrambled-image gen-
erator breaks up each picture into very small squares and subse-
quently rearranges them in a completely random fashion. The size
of the squares was set to be small enough so that the resulting
scrambled image had no resemblance to any face parts.
Following the computer task, participants filled out a packet of
questionnaires. This packet included 10 scales. First, we had a
modified self-construal scale (Park & Kitayama, 2014) to measure
scores for independence (10 items) and interdependence (10 items)
separately. Participants rated themselves on a 7-point rating scale
(1 5 “strongly disagree,” 7 5 “strongly agree”). Second, we also
had a brief version of the scales designed by Gosling, Rentfrow,
and Swann (2003) to assess Big-5 personality traits. Participants
used a 7-point rating scale and rated whether two brief descriptions
each would apply to themselves for extraversion (e.g., “extraverted
and enthusiastic”), neuroticism (referred to by Gosling et al. as
emotional stability [reversed], e.g., “anxious and easily upset”),
conscientiousness (e.g., “Dependable and self-disciplined”), open-
ness to experience (e.g., “open to new experiences and complex”),
and agreeableness (e.g., “sympathetic and warm”). The inter-item
correlations (equivalent to the reliabilities) were extremely low
(less than .3) for conscientiousness, openness, and agreeableness.
Thus, these traits were dropped. In addition, we also used the Penn
State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ: 1 5 “not at all typical of me,”
5 5 “very typical of me”) (Meyer, Miller, & Metzger, 1990) to
measure worry and the anxious arousal subscale of the Mood and
Anxiety Symptom Questionnaire (MASQ: 1 5 “not at all,”
5 5 “extremely”) (Clark & Watson, 1991) to measure anxiety. The
relevant ratings were averaged to yield mean scores. These means
as well as the reliabilities for each of the three cultural groups are
summarized in Table 1. As can be seen, the reliabilities were not
always sufficiently high (>.60) although most were close to the .60
cutting point.
After receiving a money reward (determined in accordance with
their performance on the gamble task), participants were debriefed
and dismissed.
Figure 1. The trial structure and sample face and scrambled face stimuli
of the current study.
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Physiological Recording and Processing
The EEG was recorded with 32 channel electrodes using the Bio-
SemiActiveTwo System as well as 6 external electrodes used for
ocular correction and re-referencing. The data were digitized at a
rate of 512 Hz and resampled at 256 Hz, and then re-referenced to
the average of the two mastoids. The data were analyzed using
MATLAB with EEGLAB plugin and ERPLAB extension. We
applied an offline bandpass filter with a lowpass of 30 Hz and a
high pass of 0.1 Hz. Trials were rejected if they exceeded 1/–200
mv, if they fluctuated more than 50 mv between two sampling
points, or if they had little to no activity (under .5 mv) over the
course of the trial. Trials with blinks occurring 1/–100 ms around
the face-stimulus were removed to ensure visual processing of the
priming stimuli. All other trials containing blink ocular artifacts
were corrected based on a commonly used algorithm (Gratton,
Coles, & Donchin, 1983). We segmented based on a 200 ms presti-
mulus baseline and 800 ms postfeedback (1,000 ms in total).
During a lengthy procedure like the one adopted in the current
study, participants may lose concentration and disengage from the
task on some trials. When this happened, priming stimuli might not
be processed effectively and therefore the effects of the primes may
be compromised. To address this issue, we used pretrial alpha
increase to identify the trials wherein subjects likely became disen-
gaged. Waves in the frequency range of 8–12 Hz (called alpha) are
very common during awaking hours. Importantly, they are typically
suppressed (resulting in low alpha power) when people actively
process information (Klimesch, Sauseng, & Hanslmayr, 2007). One
may therefore anticipate that the decreased pretrial alpha power is a
good index of the participant’s concentration and/or motivational
engagement during the trial. Consistent with this expectation, a recent
study found that pretrial alpha suppression during a cognitive vigi-
lance task involving detection of subthreshold stimuli significantly
correlates with subjective attention, which in turn is known to be
related to task performance (Macdonald, 2011). This finding is in line
with previous evidence that pretrial alpha suppression is correlated
with the ability of participants to detect stimuli that are presented at a
subthreshold level (Ergenoglu et al., 2004).
We computed the average alpha power between 8–12 Hz at the
O1 and O2 electrodes during the 2,000 ms time window immedi-
ately preceding the presentation of priming stimuli. This was done
separately for each participant. We then eliminated the trials that
showed an alpha increase that was greater than the average by 2
standard deviations or more. On average we eliminated 3% of
trials. In no case did we exclude more than 7% of trials. An
FRN-FRP face-priming index (see below) obtained after excluding
high-alpha trials correlated highly with the original index (obtained
before exclusion), r 5 .94.
To determine whether face primes were in fact registered and
processed, we time-locked the waveforms to the presentation of a
prime and examined an N170 component at the occipitotemporal
electrode sites. This component is thought to originate in the fusi-
form face area and respond to the processing of face stimuli
(Rossion & Jacques, 2008). An inspection of the waveforms con-
firmed the presence of N170 peaking at 160 ms postprime at the
right posterior temporal electrodes, most prominently at P8. In car-
rying out this analysis, due to the close proximity of the P8 elec-
trode and the mastoids, an average reference of all 32 electrodes
was used to measure the N170. The negativity at 160 ms postprime
was preceded by a positivity peaking at 100 ms postprime. We first
computed the average amplitudes 1/–15 ms around the two peaks
and computed the difference between them so that positive values
show a greater negative-going deflection at 160 ms postprime.
To control for other overlapping components (e.g., P3 and P2),
both FRN and FRP were measured using a base-to-peak method
recommended by previous researchers (Hajcak, Moser, Holroyd, &
Simons, 2007; Holroyd & Coles, 2002; Holroyd, Nieuwenhuis,
Yeung, & Cohen, 2003). As in previous work, the FRN peaked
around 270 ms postfeedback. The preceding positive peak was
found around 220 ms. Inspection of individual waveforms revealed,
however, that these peaks show some between-individuals varia-
tion. To minimize the noise caused by this individual difference in
the timing and relative amplitude of these peaks, we first computed
the mean amplitudes 1/–20ms around the two peaks (Luck, 2014).
We then obtained the difference between the two amplitudes. As
illustrated in Figure 2, negative values show a negative-going
deflection of the wave from the 2201/–20ms postfeedback to the
2701/–20ms postfeedback, whereas positive values show a
positive-going deflection of the wave from the 2201/–20ms post-
feedback to the 2701/–20ms postfeedback. In each condition
defined by outcome and prime, we computed both the mean
bottom-to-peak amplitude for the loss trials (FRN) and the compa-
rable mean amplitude for the win trials (FRP). The magnitude of
FRN is indicated by negative values, whereas the magnitude of
FRP is indicated by positive values.
Results
Individual Difference Measures
We first tested whether the three cultural groups would vary in
independent and interdependent self-construals. A culture x gender
Table 1. Individual Difference Measures Included in the Present Study. Reliabilities (as), Means, And Standard Deviations for each
Group are given
a Asian Americans Asian sojourners
Caucasian
Americans
AA AS CA Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Self-construal
Independence .48 .38 .80 4.99 0.59 5.18 0.48 5.37 0.68
Interdependence .60 .54 .52 5.18 0.60 5.06 0.52 4.77 0.54
Big 5 Personality Traits
Extraversion .77 .65 .87 3.57 1.49 4.57 1.33 4.57 1.77
Neuroticism .86 .79 .78 3.12 1.52 3.25 1.25 3.35 1.37
Other individual difference measures
PSWQ .58 .63 .58 52.14 14.20 48.07 11.96 51.91 11.47
Anxious Arousal .87 .65 .78 24.95 8.49 22.64 4.55 22.94 6.56
PSWQ 5 Penn State Worry Questionnaire.
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x self-construal dimension analysis of variance (ANOVA) per-
formed on the scale scores showed a significant interaction
between culture and self-construal dimension, F(2,63) 5 5.69,
p< .005, gp
2 5 .153. As expected, Caucasian Americans were both
more independent and less interdependent (Ms 5 5.38 and 4.77,
respectively), as compared to Asian Americans (Ms 5 4.99 and
5.18, respectively), ts(53) 5 2.15 and 22.64, ps< .05. Interestingly,
our Asian sojourner group fell in between, no different from either
Caucasian Americans or Asian Americans on either independence
or interdependence (Ms 5 5.18 and 5.06 for independence and
interdependence, respectively), all ps> .094. When independence
and interdependence were compared within each group, Caucasian
Americans showed a significantly higher mean score for independ-
ence than for interdependence, t(33) 5 4.00, p< .001. A difference
in the same direction was evident, but no longer significant for
Asian sojourners, t< 1. The pattern was reversed for Asian Ameri-
cans although the reversal was not statistically significant,
t(20) 5 21.10. Extraversion was significantly higher for both Cau-
casian Americans and Asian sojourners as compared to Asian
Americans, ts> 2, ps< .05. None of the other scales showed any
effect of culture. Correlations among the individual difference
measures are summarized in Table 2.
Behavioral Data
Performance in the gamble was determined in fully random fash-
ion, with a result that some participants won more (and lost less)
points than others. Although the average likelihood of win was
close to 50% (M 5 52%, SD 5 6%), the final score varied some-
what across participants (M 5 5,857 points, SD 5 2,525 points).
There was no cultural difference in the total amount earned over
the initial 5,000 points given (M 5 857 points, SD 5 2,525 points),
F< 1. Nor was there any significant cultural difference in the total
win ratio that remained similar at 52%, 52%, and 53% for Asian
Americans, Asian sojourners, and Caucasian Americans, respec-
tively, F< 1. There was no significant cultural difference in the
time required for choices, with the mean decision time of 780,
1,004, and 803 ms for Caucasian Americans, Asian sojourners, and
Asian Americans, respectively, F(2,66) 5 2.18, p> .1.
N170: An Index of Face Processing
The N170 ERP component was examined to ensure that face
stimuli were in fact registered. Unfortunately, for N170 analysis
one Asian American, one Caucasian American, and eight Asian
sojourners had to be removed due to equipment malfunction at
electrode site P8. For this reason, the Asian sojourner N170
data were dropped. Figures 3A and 3B show prime-locked
waveforms for Asian Americans and Caucasian Americans at
the P8 electrode. A 2 x 2 ANOVA performed on the N170
magnitude (prime [face versus scramble] x culture [Caucasian
versus Asian American]) showed a main effect of face,
F(2,51) 5 56.45, p< .001, gp
2 5 .525. The N170 was greater for
the face primes than for the scramble primes, showing that
faces were registered in the brain. This effect was equally
observed for the two cultural groups analyzed. The interaction
between prime and culture was negligible, F(2,51)< 2, p> .2. No
other effects achieved statistical significance.
Feedback-Related Negativity (FRN) and Positivity (FRP)
Topographic maps of difference waves (FRN-FRP) are shown in
Figures 4A, 4B, and 4C. The ERP effect is centered around FCz
and Cz, consistent with previous work on the gambling task. We
thus averaged these and three adjacent electrodes (Fz, FC1, and
FC2) to yield our measures of FRN and FRP. Mean amplitudes of
the five electrodes were highly correlated (rs> .9). A preliminary
analysis focusing only on the three face-type conditions showed no
significant effects of face type, ps> .10. We therefore combined
the three face-type conditions to form a face condition and com-
pared the collapsed face condition with the scrambled face control
Figure 2. Measurement of the bottom-to-peak amplitude of feedback-related potentials for loss (feedback-related negativity, FRP) and win (feedback-
related positivity, FRP). FRN is a negative-going deflection of ERP upon negative (i.e., loss) feedback, whereas FRP is a positive-going deflection of
ERP upon positive (i.e., win) feedback.
Table 2. Correlations Among the Individual Difference Meas-
ures and those between these Measures and the FRN Face-
Priming Effect (the last row)
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1. Independence
2. Interdependence –.10
3. Extraversion .47*** .00
4. Neuroticism –.23 –.08 –.07
5. PSWQ –.30* .06 –.29* .59***
6. Anxious Arousal –.04 –.18 –.07 .32** .32**
7. FRN face-priming
effect
.04 .26* –.24* –.10 –.03 .02
Note. ***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05. FRN 5 feedback-related negativity;
PSWQ 5 Penn State Worry Questionnaire.
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condition. The waveforms time-locked to feedback are also shown
in Figures 4A, 4B, and 4C. The time window that is relevant to
FRN and FRP (200–290 ms) is highlighted in gray. FRN and FRP
were analyzed as a function of outcome (win versus loss [or equiv-
alently, FRN versus FRP]), prime (face versus scrambled face),
point (50 versus 150), and culture (Caucasian American versus
Asian sojourners versus Asian Americans).
The mean FRNs and FRPs for the three cultural groups are sum-
marized in Table 3. Remember that we calculated FRN and FRP
such that FRNs are negative and FRPs, positive. A 3 x 2 x 2 x 2 x 2
Figure 3. N170 in the face and scrambled face conditions for Asian Americans (A) and Caucasian Americans (B). The topographic maps show that
the difference wave over the 110-210 ms window was maximal at the right posterior temporal area (P8) in both cultural groups. The Asian sojourner
group was dropped from this analysis because of attrition of a large number of participants due to deficient electrodes.
Figure 4. Face priming effect on FRN/FRP in the three cultural groups. The critical time window (200-290 ms post feedback) is indicated by the gray
rectangle. For Asian Americans (A), both the bottom-to-peak (B-P) increase of negativity for the loss trials (FRN) and the B-P increase of positivity
for win trials (FRP) were greater in the face condition (the red solid wave) than in the scrambled face condition (the black dotted wave). In contrast,
for Caucasian Americans (C), the pattern tended to be reversed. The pattern for Asian sojourners (B) was more similar to the one for Caucasian Amer-
icans (C).
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ANOVA (culture x gender x outcome x prime x point) was per-
formed on these means. As expected, FRN was significantly nega-
tive than FRP, F(1,66) 5 58.54, p< .001, gp
2 5 .47. Importantly, a
three-way interaction involving outcome, prime, and culture was
significant, F(2,66) 5 5.96, p< .005, gp
2 5 .153.1 This interaction
was not qualified by any other variables including gender and
points gained or lost on each gamble (50 versus 150 points). To
probe the nature of the outcome x prime x culture interaction, we
ran a 2 x 2 x 2 ANOVA (outcome x points x prime) on each of the
cultural groups separately. As shown in Figure 5, in all three
groups, FRN was significantly more negative than FRP. However,
this effect was significantly smaller in the face condition than in
the scramble condition for Caucasian Americans, F(1,33) 5 5.63,
p 5 .024, gp
2 5 .146. The pattern was similar for Asian sojourners
although the outcome x prime interaction was negligible for them,
F< 1. In contrast, for Asian Americans, the pattern was reversed,
with the FRN-FRN difference significantly larger in the face condi-
tion than in the scramble condition, F(1,20) 5 5.90, p 5 .025,
gp
2 5 .228.
The effect of face-priming on FRN and FRP was symmetrical,
such that where one increased, the other increased (as in the Asian
American group) whereas where one decreased, the other
decreased (as in the Caucasian American group and more subtly in
the Asian sojourner group). The effect of face, however, was some-
what stronger for FRP than for FRN. In fact, when separate culture
x prime ANOVAs were performed on FRN and FRP, the culture x
prime interaction was significant for FRP, F(2,66) 5 4.68, p 5 .013,
gp
2 5 .124, but not for FRN, F(2,66) 5 1.17, p> .3, gp
2 5 .034. How-
ever, there was no evidence that the face x culture interaction was
significantly larger for FRP than for FRN.2 Thus, the most conserv-
ative conclusion at this point is that the culture x prime interaction
occurs on FRN and FRP approximately equally.
To compare the magnitude of the face-priming effect across the
three cultural groups, we obtained a single index of face-priming
effect. We subtracted the FRN-FRP difference in the scramble con-
dition from the corresponding difference in the face condition. If
the FRN–FRP difference is larger in the face condition than in the
scramble condition (as in Asian Americans), the index will yield a
positive score, whereas if the FRN–FRP difference is smaller in the
face condition than in the scramble condition (as in Caucasians and
Asian sojourners), the index will yield a negative score. With Fish-
er’s least significant differences (LSD) test, the face-priming index
was significantly more positive for Asian Americans than for both
Caucasian Americans and Asian sojourners, ps< .001 and .05,
respectively. The difference between the latter two groups was neg-
ligible. Hence, the pattern for Asian sojourners was closer to the
pattern for Caucasian Americans than for Asian Americans.
Last, the 3 x 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 ANOVA (culture x gender x outcome
x prime x point) showed a significant main effect of culture,
F(2,66) 5 3.25, p< .05, gp
2 5 xxx. As evident in Figure 5, both FRN
and FRP tend to be more negative in Caucasians as compared to
the two Asian groups. For Caucasians, FRN was clearly visible, but
FRP was not. In contrast, for the two Asian groups, FRP was visi-
ble, but FRN was not. It appears that Caucasians are rather optimis-
tic in the sense that their default expectation is to win gambles
(thus, resulting in an error signal when they lose). In contrast,
Asians (both Asian Americans and Asian sojourners) appear to be
pessimistic in the sense that their default expectation is to lose
gambles (thus, resulting in an error signal when they win). This
phenomenon is consistent with previous behavioral evidence
(Chang & Asakawa, 2003; Kitayama et al., 1997), and must be fur-
ther investigated in the future.
Relationship Between Self-Construal and Face-Priming
Effect
Table 2 summarizes the correlations between the individual differ-
ence measures and the FRN-FRP face-priming effect. Two correla-
tions were significant. Interdependent self-construal was associated
positively with the FRN-FRP face-priming effect, r 5 .26, p 5 .03,
whereas extraversion was associated negatively with it, r 5 –.24,
p 5 .05. Pertinent scatter plots can be found in Figures 6A and 6B.
The finding that the face-priming effect was predicted by inter-
dependent self-construal is consistent with the hypothesis that indi-
viduals who are embedded in tightly knit, interdependent social
relations associate emotions of worry and anxiety to images of gen-
eralized others. Thus, it is of interest to determine whether the cul-
tural difference in the face-priming effect we observed would be
mediated by interdependent self-construal. In this analysis, we
Table 3. Mean FRN (Negative ERP Deflection Around 270 ms Postfeedback in the loss Condition) and FRP (Positive ERP
Deflection) as a Function of Face-Priming and Culture
Asian Americans Asian sojourners Caucasian Americans
Face Scrambled face Face Scrambled face Face Scrambled face
Loss (FRN) M 20.73 20.24 0.29 0.08 22.4 22.86
SD 3.47 3.86 2.74 3.32 3.13 3.97
Win (FRP) M 1.91 0.91 1.93 2.27 0.02 0.68
SD 3.14 4.01 2.26 2.24 3.84 3.9
Difference 22.64 21.15 21.64 22.19 22.42 23.54
FRN 5 feedback-related negativity; FRP 5 feedback-related positivity.
1. This interaction was no different when the percentage of win ver-
sus loss was used as a covariate, F(2,65) 5 5.50, p 5 .01, gp
2 5 .11. We
thus dropped this covariate. It is of note, however, that this variable
interacted with outcome, F(1,65) 5 8.06, p< .01, gp
2 5 .145. FRN became
significantly larger when the percent winning increased (and thus, the
perceived likelihood of winning increased), r 5 .25, p< .05. Curiously,
there was no such correlation for FRP. No interpretation was attempted.
2. That is, when FRP was reversely coded so that both FRP and FRN
vary in the same direction, the outcome x prime x culture interaction
was negligible, F< 1. Nevertheless, more research is required before
firm conclusions can be made. In particular, recent studies (see Proudfit,
2015, for a review) have shown that both FRP and FRN can be decom-
posed into separable components that are linked to dissociable functions
such as reward processing and error processing. It might seem plausible
that whereas FRP is influenced primarily by reward processing (as
argued by Proudfit), FRN may be modulated by error processing. One
promising direction of future work, then, will be to test finer-grained
hypotheses about how these separable components (and the brain activ-
ities reflected in them) might respond to face cues. This work may show
whether and how the conditioning of the brain regions to the face cues
might vary across cultural groups.
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focused on Caucasian Americans and Asian Americans because
these two groups are arguably more comparable than Asian
sojourners because both groups spent much of their lives in the
United States. The main difference between the two groups is their
cultural background. In contrast, Asian sojourners might be a
widely heterogeneous group of Asians who moved to the United
States under different circumstances after spending earlier lives in
different Asian societies.
A mediation analysis was thus conducted to analyze the extent
that interdependent self-construal accounts for the relationship
between culture and the FRN-FRP face-priming effect (see
Figure 7). When culture (Asian American 5 1, Caucasian Ameri-
can 5 0) was a sole predictor, it significantly predicted the face-
priming effect. When interdependent self-construal was entered,
the mediated link (Culture ! Interdependent self-construal !
Face-priming effect) was significant, while the direct effect of cul-
ture was reduced (95% bias-corrected bootstrapping confidence
interval (CI) 5 [.0472, .8126]). The mediation was partial because
the direct effect of culture remained significant after the mediator
(interdependent self-construal) was entered. We also ran a compa-
rable analysis with extraversion as a potential mediator, which did
not yield any evidence of mediation.
Discussion
FRN-FRP, Face, and Culture
The goal of the current investigation was to test the hypothesis that
a mere exposure to face cues (i.e., face-priming) is sufficient to
modulate the sensitivity of the ACC-based error-monitoring system
(Kitayama & Tompson, 2015). On the basis of previous cultural
psychological work, we expected that this effect would depend on
participants’ cultural background. Specifically, for Asians, we pre-
dicted face-priming to increase the sensitivity of the ACC. Thus,
both FRP and FRN were expected to be larger in the face (as com-
pared to scrambled face) condition. In support of this expectation,
we found the FRN-FRP face-priming effect to be significantly pos-
itive for Asian Americans. In contrast, for Caucasian Americans
Figure 5. FRN and FRP as a function of face priming and culture. The
Y-axis indicates the magnitude of FRN (negative values) and FRP (posi-
tive values). Whereas face-priming increases both FRN and FRP for
Asian Americans, it decreases FRN and FRP for Caucasian Americans.
The pattern for Asian sojourners was similar to the pattern for Cauca-
sian Americans.
Figure 6. Predicting FRN-FRP face priming effect as a function of interdependent self-construal (A) and extraversion (B). Interdependence predicted
an increase of FRN-FRP face priming effect, whereas extraversion predicted a decrease of this effect.
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we anticipated that face-priming would desensitize the ACC, which
in turn should decrease the magnitude of both FRP and FRN. As
predicted, the FRN-FRP face-priming effect was significantly neg-
ative. The face-priming effect was significantly larger for Asian
Americans than for Caucasian Americans. The contrast between
Caucasian Americans and Asian Americans extended findings
from an earlier study by Park and Kitayama (2014) by showing
that an analogous face-priming effect is evident even when the task
is neither linked to competence nor involving any motor responses.
Our analysis received additional evidence from the correlations
we observed between the FRN-FRP face-priming effect and indi-
vidual difference measures. The FRN-FRP face-priming effect
increased as a function of interdependent self-construal, whereas it
decreased as a function of extraversion. Notably, when Asian
Americans were compared against Caucasian Americans, the cul-
tural difference in the FRN-FRP face-priming effect was signifi-
cantly mediated by interdependent self-construal (Figure 7). This
finding supports the hypothesis that how one views the self as con-
nected with others may be instrumental in establishing implicit
meanings associated with the face images and consequently one’s
neural responses to the presentation of a face.
In the current work, we found little evidence that emotional
expressions of the priming faces had any effect on the face-priming
effect. However, we remain cautious in interpreting this finding,
since it could be an artifact due to our study being underpowered
because of a relatively small number of trials allocated to each
emotion condition. Moreover, it could also be possible that sche-
matic faces may not be sufficiently realistic to elicit differential
reactions, and thus yield no differences between emotion condi-
tions. Future studies might discover effects should they use a larger
number of trials and more realistic faces.
Sojourner Paradox?
Interestingly, a pattern for Asians who spent less than 10 years in
the United States (called Asian sojourners) was similar to the pat-
tern we observed for Caucasian Americans rather than Asian
Americans. This finding is mirrored by a similar cultural differen-
ces observed when analyzing self-construal measures. As com-
pared to Caucasian Americans, Asian Americans were clearly less
independent and more interdependent. However, Asian sojourner
means fell between the two extremes, not significantly different
from either group.
Previous cultural studies that tested East–West differences often
compare Caucasian Americans with either Asians living in East
Asian countries such as China, Japan, and Korea or with Asian
Americans. To the best of our knowledge, the current study is the
first that systematically compared Asian sojourners with Asian
Americans. However, a few previous studies compared Caucasians
with Asian sojourners. One study to note examined the cultural var-
iation in causal attribution, expecting Asians (but not Caucasian
Americans) to seek more situational reasons as an explanation for
another person’s behavior. This study tested Chinese graduate stu-
dents at the University of Michigan and found them to be virtually
no different from Caucasian American students (Morris & Peng,
1994). Another study tested whether Asians might be more holistic
in attention than Caucasian Americans. When Japanese sojourners
at the University of Chicago were tested, they were relatively more
similar to Caucasian Americans (who were less holistic) than
Asians in Asia (who were highly holistic) (Kitayama et al., 2003).
In neither of these studies, comparable groups of Asian Americans
were tested.
It is possible that Asian sojourners quickly acculturate to
become virtually no different from Caucasian Americans within a
fairly short time span. This could be because many of them are
highly motivated to be similar to those in the mainstream U.S. cul-
ture (i.e., Caucasian Americans rather than other minority group
members including Asian Americans). This hypothesis, however,
may be hard-pressed to account for the fact that Asian Americans
remain to be both less independent and more interdependent as
compared to Caucasian Americans. Indeed, some existing studies
suggest that acculturation of Asian immigrants to North American
mainstream cultures can take at least a few generations
(Heine et al., 1999). It would seem more plausible, then, that Asian
sojourners in top U.S. universities are self-selected to be more inde-
pendent even before they come to the United States. These Asians
may choose to come to the United States in part because they are
already independent and find it hard to fit into Asian, interdepend-
ent societies. This issue must be more systematically addressed in
future work. Future work should look into these alternative possi-
bilities by closely examining each individual’s immigration profile
and personal history.
Limitations and Future Directions
We wish to acknowledge shortcomings of the current work. First,
we deliberately chose to use schematic faces to test the hypothesis
that the ACC is sensitive to the image of “generalized other.” How-
ever, future work should use real face images as well to see if the
results might converge. In all likelihood, emotions that are associ-
ated with face images may vary widely as a function of the faces
being attractive or unattractive, an ally or enemy, and of the same
or opposite sex. Although future work could attempt to manipulate
these variables, the current paradigm may serve as a powerful
means to identify reward/punishment contingencies that are tacitly
established in different cultural contexts.
Second, within the current gamble paradigm it was difficult to
examine behavioral consequences of reward prediction errors. One
might suppose that after an unexpected loss, people work harder to
win on the next gamble. However, it is not clear exactly what
behaviors this effort might foster. In fact, in the current work, the
ERP signals of reward prediction errors (FRP and FRN) predicted
none of the behavioral measures we tested (i.e., choice of the same
square or the other one, increase or decrease of response time).
Future work would benefit from an identification of reliable behav-
ioral indicators of the motivation to win in a gamble.
Figure 7. Results of a mediation analysis examining the role of interde-
pendent self-construal in mediating the relationship between culture and
the FRN-FRP face priming effect. Unstandardized coefficients are
shown. The values in parentheses show the relationship between culture
and the FRN-FRP face priming effect after controlling for interdepend-
ent self-construal. The values in square brackets are 95% bias-corrected
confidence intervals from a bootstrap test with 2,000 replications; the
mediation is significant if the confidence interval does not include zero.
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Despite these open issues, the current work clearly shows the
importance of culture in analyzing brain responses that occur both
spontaneously and automatically. Our findings suggest that psycho-
logical processes can depend on culture and, therefore, accurate
descriptions of these processes would require careful specification
of dimensions of culture. Moreover, these findings suggest that the
field of psychology as a whole would benefit from more careful
analysis of the cultural backgrounds and other features participants
bring to the study.
Last, our work contributes to the effort put forth by the field of
cultural neuroscience, which has emerged at the interface of cul-
tural psychology and neuroscience over the last several years (Han
et al., 2013; Kim & Sasaki, 2014; Kitayama & Uskul, 2011;
Kitayama, Park, & Cho, 2015). The cultural neuroscience approach
is premised on the hypothesis that the human mind is biologically
prepared and, yet, it requires substantial sociocultural input to be
complete and fully functional. Our work underscores that the role
of society and culture in shaping neural mechanisms may be much
larger than typically assumed by many scholars in both psychology
and neuroscience. It thus provides further evidence on the impor-
tance of assessing the extent of sociocultural influences on the
brain across various domains of human functioning.
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